Abstract-In wireless networks, we need to allocate spectrum efficiently. One challenge is that the spectrum usage requests often come in an online fashion. The second challenge is that the secondary users in a cognitive radio network are often selfish and prefer to maximize their own benefits. In this paper, we address these two challenges by proposing TOFU, a semi-truthful online frequency allocation method for wireless networks when primary users can sublease the spectrums to secondary users. In our protocol, secondary users are required to submit the spectrum bid time slots before its usage. Upon receiving an online spectrum request, our protocol will decide whether to grant its exclusive usage or not, within at least time slots of requests' arrival. We assume that existing spectrum usage can be preempted with some compensation. For various possible known information, we analytically prove that the competitive ratios of our methods are within small constant factors of the optimum online method. Furthermore, in our mechanisms, no selfish users will gain benefits by bidding lower than their willing payment. Our extensive simulation results show that they perform almost optimum: Our methods get a total profit that is more than 95% of the offline optimum when is about the duration of spectrum usage 1.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE CURRENT fixed spectrum allocation scheme leads to significant spectrum white spaces. Several new spectrum management models [19] have been proposed to improve the spectrum usage. One promising technology is the opportunistic spectrum usage. Subleasing is widely regarded as another potential way to share spectrum if we ensure that primary users' spectrum usage is not interfered with. In this work, we assume that there is a set of secondary nodes that will share a spectrum channel. Each secondary user may wish to pay (by leasing) for the usage of the available spectrum. Previous studies on spectrum assignment (e.g., [16] , [28] , and [29] ) often assume that the information of all spectrum requests is known before allocation is made. However, the spectrum usage requests often arrive online, and the central authority (typically a primary user) needs to quickly decide whether the requests are granted or not. Here, we assume that upon receiving an online spectrum request, our protocol needs to decide whether to grant its exclusive usage or not, within at least time slots. The rejection typically could not be revoked. Two different approaches of granting the request could be used: preemptive and nonpreemptive. In this work, we consider preemptive requests where the central authority could potentially terminate the current running request(s) to satisfy this new request to potentially make more profits. Assume that requests terminated cannot be restarted or resumed later (so it is also called "abortion"). Terminating a running request , the central authority has to pay a penalty that is times the amount paid for the remaining unserved time slots.
Without any known constraint on requests, we show that the competitive ratio of any online spectrum allocation method can be arbitrarily bad when preemption is not allowed. This is because any online method has to accept the first coming request (it is possible that no other requests come), therefore missing the following conflicting requests with an arbitrarily large value. In this work, we focus on the case when we know that the maximum time requirement is time slots. We always assume that every request arrives at the beginning of a time slot and the number of time slots requested is an integer . To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study online spectrum allocation with cancellation and preemption penalty.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We find that the best competitive ratio achievable depends on , and there are three regimes here. We design several efficient online spectrum allocation methods, called TOFU, that perform almost optimum in all cases. When , our protocol has a constant competitive ratio depending on . When , we show that the competitive ratio of any online method is at most . We then show that our protocol TOFU achieves the bound . When , we show that the competitive ratio of any online algorithm is at most . We then show that our online method TOFU has competitive ratios that match the bounds asymptotically, i.e.,
. Our extensive simulations show that our methods have competitive ratios almost 95% in most cases, even compared to the optimum offline spectrum allocation method that knows all future inputs. We also extend our protocol to a more general case in which the secondary users are distributed arbitrarily and the required service regions are heterogeneous disks. We show that the same asymptotic lower bounds and upper bounds apply to this general model.
We also design an efficient auction mechanism for spectrum allocation when secondary users are selfish. In such a mechanism, each user will be charged an amount, say , if its request is granted. We show that in our online mechanism, to maximize its profit, no secondary user will bid lower than its actual valuation. However, a user may have a chance to improve its profit by bidding higher than its actual valuation. We call this property semi-truthful. Recall that a protocol is called truthful in the literature if no user can lie about its bid to improve its profit. Our methods still achieve similar results when the requested region of each user is a sectoral cell.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define in detail the problems to be studied. In Section III, we present upper bounds on the competitive ratios of any online allocation methods. Then, we present our solutions in Section IV and analytically prove the performance bounds of our methods. We extend our methods to networks with general conflict graphs in Section V. We present our mechanisms to deal with selfish users in Section VI. Our simulation studies are reported in Section VII. We review the related work in Section VIII and conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Network and System Models
We consider a wireless network consisting of some primary users who hold the right of some spectrum channels for subleasing. There is a central authority who decides the spectrum assignment on behalf of these primary users. In other words, we assume that each primary user will trust the central authority and is satisfied with what it will get from the auction based on the mechanism designed. If each primary user has an asking price for its spectrums, we need to design mechanisms (such as a double auction in which buyers enter competitive bidders and sellers enter competitive offers simultaneously) that also take into account the selfish behavior of primary users. We leave this as a future work and note that Wang et al. [20] proposed some truthful double-auction mechanisms with known distributions on bids. The wireless network also consists of some secondary users . Those secondary users may lease the spectrum usage in some region for a time period at any time. In this paper, we assume a simple scenario where there is only one channel available. We leave it as a future work to design allocation and auction schemes when multiple channels are available and a secondary user may request for a number of channels at same time.
Secondary users may reside at different geometry locations. Here, we assume that each request is associated with a disk region. Whether a secondary user's request of channels conflicts with the request of another secondary user depends on their locations, in addition to the required time period. This location-dependent conflict will be modeled by a conflict graph , where two nodes and form an edge in if and only if they cannot use same channel simultaneously. We will first study the networks with a complete conflict graph, and then extend our methods to cases when requested disks are of arbitrary sizes. We will show that our methods have asymptotically optimum performance guarantees in both cases.
B. Problem Formulation
Assume that secondary users will ask for spectrum usage on the fly. A user could ask for spectrum usage at different time slots. Let , be the sequence of all requests. Each request is claimed by a secondary user at time , who bids for the usage of the channel from time to time . Here, we also omit the region requirement since we first address networks with a complete conflict graph. For most of our discussions, we will omit the user when it is clear from the context. In other words, denotes the th request. Obviously, for all requests, which means only spectrum usage in the future can be requested. Assume time is slotted, and time requirement must be an integer. We also assume that every user will ask for the spectrum usage for at most time slots ( for all ). We call the time bound.
Since the objective for spectrum auction/lease is to improve spectrum utilization and improve the revenue from the spectrum auction/lease, the central authority (i.e., spectrum auctioneer) can post a requirement that all requests must be submitted in advance of a certain time slot. In this paper, we assume that for every request for a value given by the auctioneer. Hereafter, we call the advance factor. Each request is claimed at least time slots before its required usage. Intuitively, a larger advance factor will give more advantage to the central authority. We later will show that the asymptotic performances of our methods do not depend on as long as , the delay factor.
The advance factor puts some constraints on the secondary users as to when they should submit their bids. To be fair, our system will also put some condition on the central authority about when the central authority should make a decision on each request. In this paper, we always require that the central authority should make a decision on a request within time slots of its arrival time. We call delay factor in the spectrum allocation problem. Obviously, we need to make the system meaningful. When , the central authority has to make a decision immediately on request at time . When , the central authority could make decision as late as possible. If a request has been rejected, it will never be reconsidered and accepted later. Fig. 1 illustrates our model of advance and delay factor. For each request, its arrival time must be before time in the figure, and the central authority must make a decision before time in the figure. Since the central authority is not able to estimate an accurate price for spectrum usage, our model lets the central authority accept a reservation in advance, and lets the secondary user get a reasonable guarantee. Crucially, to improve the spectrum usage and revenue, we also let the central authority terminate a reserved/running request at a later time for a new request with higher priority at any time. Cancellation and preemption are necessary to take advantage of a spike in demand and rising prices for spectrum channels and not be forced to sell the spectrum below the market because of an a priori contract. When current spectrum usage is terminated, the penalty should be paid to compensate the preemption. Here, we assume that the penalty is a linear function of the unfinished time of that request , i.e., for a constant . Notice that the cancellation is modeled as since the spectrum usage was not started at all. Here, the constant is the penalty factor. We also summarize the symbols used in this paper in Table I .
As we stated before, all requests arrive on the fly, thus any information about the future-e.g., the distribution of future bids, the arrival times, the start times, and the required time durations-are all unknown. The objective of the spectrum allocation is to find an allocation that maximizes the total net profit, i.e., the total payment collected minus the total penalties caused by preemption and cancellation.
To evaluate the performance of an online algorithm, we usually compare it to an optimal offline algorithm. The following lemma indicates the hardness of the offline version of our problem.
Lemma 1: Even knowing all requests, it is NP-hard to find an optimal spectrum allocation that maximizes the total bids of admitted requests.
Proof: Observe that the maximum weighted independent set (MWIS) problem in geometry graph is a special case of the spectrum allocation problem: We assume that all spectrum requests are for the same time duration, the graph for the MWIS problem is the conflict graph , and the weight of a node is the bid value of the spectrum request by this node. Recall that MWIS in geometry graph itself is an NP-complete problem [15] . Thus, the lemma follows.
For all online spectrum allocation problems studied here, we will design online algorithms with constant competitive ratios if advance factor is chosen carefully.
The performance of an online algorithm for spectrum allocation is measured by its competitive ratio , where is any possible sequence of requests arrival, is the profit produced by online algorithm on input and is the profit produced by optimum offline algorithm OPT on input when the sequence is known in advance by OPT. In this work, when we study the competitive ratio, we assume all users are truthful. Given a sequence of spectrum requests, at any time instant , an online spectrum allocation method only knows all spectrum requests that arrived from time to time slot . On the other hand, for the same sequence of spectrum requests, although the optimum offline method also has to make decision for a request within time slots of its arrival, it does know all future requests it will get, thus it makes a smarter decision.
As we will see later, the performances of our methods and the lower bounds on the performance of any online algorithm vary when the penalty factor , the advance factor , and the delay factor are different. For certain parameters , and , we call it problem in this paper.
III. UPPER BOUNDS ON ALL ONLINE METHODS
In this section, we present upper bounds on the competitive ratios of online allocation methods in cases depending on whether is less than 1, equal to 1, or larger than 1. These bounds will be proved to be almost tight later.
A. Upper Bound for Problem
We first show upper bounds on the competitive ratios when . Note that in this case we assume that every preempted job must be executed for at least one time slot.
The main approach of our proofs in this section is adversary argument: An adversary carefully constructs sequences of requests to make the performance of online algorithms as bad as possible. The trick is that the adversary can choose the future requests based on the current decision of online algorithms. Then, no matter what decision is made, certain performance cannot be achieved.
Theorem 2: Let . No online algorithm has a competitive ratio for problem when for .
B. Upper Bound for Problem
When the penalty factor , there are two different cases: or . 1) When , i.e., , we first show that no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio more than for problem. Then, we improve this bound to .
2) When
, we show that problem cannot have a competitive ratio for an arbitrary . Theorem 3 [23] : No online algorithm has a competitive ratio for problem when . Theorem 4 [23] : No online algorithm has competitive ratio for problem, where for problem when . Theorem 5 [23] : No online algorithm has a competitive ratio for an arbitrary small , for problem when .
C. Upper Bound for Problem
For problem, we show that the upper bound of competitive ratios is when .
Theorem 6 [23] : No online algorithm has a competitive ratio more than for problem, when . A surprising result from the analysis in this section is that, the performance upper bounds do not depend on the advance factor . In other words, no matter how many time slots the secondary users claim their requests in advance, the theoretical upper bounds will not be improved asymptotically if the delay factor does not change.
IV. EFFICIENT ONLINE ALLOCATION METHODS
In this section, we present several methods for efficient online spectrum allocation. We then analytically study the performances of our methods and prove that they have asymptotically best competitive ratios. All results in this section assume that the conflict graph of the network is a complete graph.
A. Method for Problem
When , whenever we admit a request at time , even if we preempt it at next time slot , we still receive a profit . Thus, we will adopt the following strategy : At any time , let be the request from the set of all currently available requests, denoted as , with the largest bid among all requests whose starting time is . We admit request at time . It is easy to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7: Strategy is at least -competitive.
B. Method for Problem
We then consider the case , i.e., the preemption penalty is exactly the remaining portion of the bid. Since we do not know anything about the future, to maximize the total profits, we shall accept requests with a large bid or a large bid per time slot (called density) intuitively. The main difficulty is the tradeoff between requests with a large bid and requests with large density. Our results on upper bounds of competitive ratio in Section III illustrate some intuitions. Here and in Section IV-C, we design online algorithms whose competitive ratios match corresponding upper bounds.
Consider current time , and let be all spectrum requests submitted before time , which are not processed. Based on the delay requirement, we know that all requests in must be submitted during the time slots , and their starting times must be in the time interval . Among all spectrum requests in , let be all spectrum requests whose starting times are in the time interval . Recall that we always have . Our online algorithms will only make decisions at time using the information about requests , although they know a superset of requests . See Fig. 2 for an illustration, where and . We will show that our method can achieve a competitive ratio that is already asymptotically optimum. In other words, knowing the information will not enable us to get a method with a better competitive ratio asymptotically.
1) Candidate Requests Set: For requests , we will find some subsets, called the candidate requests set, using dynamic programming to optimize some objective functions. Our method will then make decisions on whether to admit these subsets of requests under some conditions involving the currently running spectrum usages.
Definition 1: Candidate Requests Set: 1) A strong candidate requests set at time , denoted as , is a subset of requests from that has the largest total bids if were allowed to run from time to time at most . See Fig. 3 for an illustration, where since the total profit during time interval is maximized. We abuse the notation a little bit here by also letting denote the profit made by . Also, let denote the profit made from if are admitted and then possibly preempted at a time slot . 2) A weak candidate requests set at time , denoted as , is a subset of requests from that has the largest total bids if were allowed to run during time interval (assume they are preempted at time ). We abuse the notation a little bit here by also letting denote the profit made by . Briefly speaking, maximizes the total bids at time , and maximizes the total bid per time slot in the predictable future (since the requests are claimed in advance). Observe that the starting times of candidate sets are in the interval . Since
, at time , we should know all requests whose starting times are from to . Algorithm 1 summarizes our method finding . For each and , the algorithm takes time to compute . Therefore, it takes time to find , where is the total number of spectrum requests in . Our method can be easily extended to find with the same running time. 2) Our Greedy Algorithm : We then propose an online algorithm . At each time , the input of our algorithm is . Algorithm should decide whether a request that arrived at time slot will be accepted or rejected. The basic idea of our method is as follows.
Assume that time 0 is the reference point for time. First, before time , we do not need to make decisions on any arrived requests. At time , we need to decide whether to accept/reject requests that arrive at time 0. If the channel is not occupied, we will simply accept the request from with the earliest starting time being , if there is any. We call virtual meta job requests currently being accepted.
For any time , our method will choose either a request from the strong candidate request or a request from weak candidate request , or continue to run the request (which could be empty) chosen previously. Our method deals with three complementary cases about the channel status at time separately.
Case 1: Nonoccupied Channel: If the channel will be empty at time , we find with the maximum overall profit in . We accept the request in with starting time , and we say that the channel is being used by candidate requests set . In other words, here we treat as a large virtual meta spectrum request. Note that at current time slot , we only admit the first spectrum request from while leaving the admission decisions on other requests in pending. Whether these pending "admitted" requests will actually be admitted depends on future coming requests. If future coming requests are better, we will preempt this virtual meta request . 1 Thus, those preempted pending admissions from will not be processed at all.
Case 2: Occupied by Weak Candidate Requests: If the channel will be used by a weak candidate requests set at time and this candidate requests set weakly preempted (exact definitions will be given later) some other candidate requests set before, all requests from submitted at time will not be admitted. Case 3: Occupied by Strong Candidate Requests: The last case is that the channel will be used by a strong candidate requests set at time . Assume the request to be run at time is from some virtual candidate requests set . There are three possible steps in this case. 1) We first find the strong candidate requests set . The first request such that will be accepted only if (1) where is a constant parameter. In other words, we use a virtual meta request to replace another virtual request if the potential profit from a new virtual meta request is sufficiently larger. We call it a strong-preemption. 2) If strong-preemption cannot be applied, we find
. The request such that will be accepted only if (2) where is an adjustable control parameter. In other words, we use a virtual candidate requests set to replace another virtual candidate requests set if the profit from this new meta request and the profit from the meta request being preempted at future time are at least a constant fraction of the profit by keeping the meta request running. We call it a weak-preemption. In this subcase, all requests in will be accepted, and the last request will be terminated at time automatically.
3) If the weak-preemption cannot be applied also, we accept the request in the previously used candidate requests set , whose starting time is (if there is any), or continue the request that will run through the time slot . Algorithm 2 summarizes our online spectrum allocation method . 
C. Method for Problem
Here, we propose a greedy algorithm for problem. At time , our method should decide whether a request whose start time is will be accepted. 
V. MORE GENERAL NETWORKS
All studies in previous sections assumed that the conflict graph of networks, which models the location-dependent conflict, is a complete graph. In this section, we extend our algorithms for the networks where each request asks for spectrum usage in a disk-shaped region centered at with a radius . For the performance upper bounds, all lemmas and theorems in Section III still hold since complete conflict graph is a special case.
If we can find the strong (weak) candidate sets in polynomial time as we did by using Algorithm 1 in Section IV-B, then our method (or ) still works since all previous analysis still holds. However, the main difficulty is that, in this case, the central authority may accept multiple requests at the same time, which makes it hard to get the strong/weak candidate sets in polynomial time by using dynamic programming. Therefore, we propose to approximate strong/weak candidate sets at each time in polynomial time by using shifting strategy [15] as follows.
We divide the request disks into different levels according to their radii. At the same level, the radii of all request disks are within a constant factor of each other. Let be the diameter of the smallest request disk. Level includes all request disks whose diameters are within . First, we show that a PTAS can be achieved in each level . In other words, here we approximate the strong/weak candidate sets when only request disks in level are considered. Let be an integer. At level , a partition is defined as the region partitioned by a set of horizontal lines , and a set of vertical lines . In each partition, the region is partitioned into a number of squares. We ignore the requests whose disks are hit by any lines of the partition, and find the strong/weak candidate sets in each square. Together with strong/weak candidate sets in all squares, we get strong/weak candidate sets for a partition.
Lemma 15: Strong/weak candidate sets for each partition can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: According to area argument, the number of independent requests that can be accepted at the same time is no more than , which is a constant. Then, we can find the strong/weak candidate sets in each square in polynomial time by using dynamic programming as we did in Algorithm 1. Assume requests located in a square whose top left corner is in a partition at time . The main difference is that we need to define as the maximum possible profit from when are the last independent requests accepted by the central authority before or at time . Then where is the latest start time among . Since there are at most different , and each can be computed within time, the time complexity to compute strong/weak candidate sets in a square whose left top corner is at time is . Let denote the total number of requests in . The time complexity to compute strong/weak candidate sets in all squares of a partition at time is no more than . In each partition, some requests may be ignored. To achieve a better approximation, we shift the horizontal and vertical lines, and compute strong/weak candidate sets for partitions where and . We set the best strong/weak candidate sets among all partitions as the strong/weak candidate sets of time . It takes time to find strong/weak candidate sets at each time. Then, the total running time is at most where is the number of total requests since we have to compute this at most times.
On the other hand, the strong/weak candidate sets we find are at least a approximation as in the following lemma. Lemma 16: At least one partition achieves at least approximation.
Proof: We prove the lemma by using a strong candidate set. The weak candidate set case follows same proof. Let denote the total profit made by all requests such that: 1) it appears in ; (2) it is not ignored in partition . Then since each request is ignored in at most two partitions. On the other hand, is smaller than the profit of the strong candidate set for partition , which is no larger than the profit of our approximated strong candidate set, called . In other words which implies and finishes the proof. According to Lemmas 15 and 16, shifting strategy gives a PTAS for each level . The result can be extended when request disks in all levels are considered. The main technology is dynamic programming, which is discussed in [15, Sec. 3.2] . We omit the details here.
Since the strong/weak candidate sets can be approximated well, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 17: Our methods will achieve asymptotically optimum competitive ratios in polynomial time for general networks modeled by disk graphs. The competitive ratios will have an additional factor for any constant compared to previous analysis, when we set .
VI. TOFU: DEALING WITH SELFISH USERS
In this section, we show how to design a mechanism based on the allocation algorithm described in Section IV when secondary users could be selfish. For the spectrum allocation and auction problem, when each secondary user declares its request, it may lie on the bid and time requirement. We need to design rules such that each secondary user has incentives to declare its request truthfully. Each secondary user has its own private information , including , and . Let be the value user will report. For each vector of actions , a mechanism (including allocation algorithm and pricing scheme ) computes a spectrum allocation and a payment vector . Each user will be allocated and be charged . A mechanism is said to be truthful if it satisfies both incentive-compatible (IC) and individual-rational (IR) properties. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if every user will maximize its utility by reporting its private type truthfully. A mechanism is individual-rational if the utility of an agent winning the auction is not less than its utility of losing the auction. We assume that no user will delay its request and a user will not lie about and . Unfortunately, in this paper, we cannot design an online spectrum allocation mechanism that is always truthful. Instead, we will show that under our mechanism TOFU, regardless of the actions of other users, no user can improve its profit by reporting a bid that is smaller than its true bid value . We call this property semi-truthful.
For the spectrum auction problem, the final profit (or the utility) of a user is 0 if its request is rejected. If its request is admitted, the final profit is where is the actual valuation, is the real payment, and is the potential preemption penalty, where is the actual bid of user .
It is a forklore result that the allocation method in a mechanism that can prevent lying must have the monotone property. Here, a spectrum allocation method is monotone if a user is granted the spectrum usage under with a bid , then the user will still be granted the spectrum usage under if the user increases bid and/or decreases the required time duration . First, our methods (Algorithms 2 and 3) presented in the previous section do have the monotone property. In our algorithm, we need to find both a strong candidate requests set and weak candidate requests set. Both sets will be found by dynamic programming. It is easy to show that these dynamic programming methods are monotone. Thus, it is possible to design a mechanism using our algorithms ( and ) as spectrum allocation methods.
Consider a user , assume the bids of all other users remain the same. We first propose the following definition based on the monotone property of our methods.
Definition 3: Let be the minimum bid that has to bid to get admitted when its spectrum request is to be processed at time slots later. Let be the minimum bid that has to bid to get admitted and not get preempted later.
Clearly, . For a secondary user whose request is not granted, the value
. The values and clearly can be computed in polynomial time since the bid values of all other users are known. Here, can be computed at the time .
To compute the value , we need to know whether request will be preempted later. Since the latest job that can preempt must have starting time no later than , we must process the potential jobs that can preempt no later than . In other words, the value can be computed within time after job arrived. Then, our protocol TOFU works as follows.
Algorithm 4: TOFU Semi-Truthful Online Spectrum Auction
1: Based on the setting, we use either Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3 to decide whether a request will be admitted or not. 2: Our mechanism will charge a user a payment Theorem 18: Our mechanism TOFU is semi-truthful, i.e., to maximize its profit, every secondary user will not bid a price lower than its actual value.
Proof: Consider a user arrived at time . Let be its private willing bid and be its actual bid. When bids some value will get preempted with some unserved time and receive a compensation .
Case 1:
. There are three strategies again for .
1) If
, then user will be admitted and will not be preempted. It will be charged a payment and thus will get a profit .
2) If
, it will not get admitted, and thus gets 0 utility.
3) If
, then will be admitted and then be preempted with unserved time . It will get a compensation . Its utility then is , which is less than the profit that it will get when reported since . Thus, in all subcases, reporting untruthfully will not gain any benefit for .
Case 2:
. There are five strategies for . 1) If , it will be admitted and then preempted. Let be the unserved time slots when bidding . Then, its utility is .
2) If
3) If
, it will not get admitted, and thus gets 0 utility. 4) If , then will be admitted and then be preempted with a shorter unserved time due to the monotone property of our method. It will get a compensation . Its utility then is , which is larger than the profit that it will get when reported since .
5) If
, then will be admitted and then be preempted with a longer unserved time . Its utility then is , which is smaller than the profit that it will get when reported since . Thus, in all subcases, reporting lower will not gain any benefit for .
Case 3:
. There are several strategies again for .
1) If
, it will not get admitted, and thus has 0 profit.
2) If
, it will be admitted and not be preempted. In this case, its profit is .
3) If
, it will be admitted and be preempted with an unserved time . In this case, its profit is since and . In all subcases, bidding untruthfully is not beneficial to user .
Observe that, in our scheme, the only scenario [Case 2-4)] where a secondary user can gain benefit is when and it bids a value . The user must bid larger than its true valuation , but not larger than . Observe that value is computed at time using the requests submitted during time interval , where user does not know when it arrives at time . Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 19: If any user does not know the requests within time after its arrival, our mechanism TOFU is truthful, i.e., to maximize its profit, every secondary user will bid truthfully even if it learned history.
It is not difficult to construct examples in which a user can gain profit by bidding larger than its true valuation if it can know the bids of other users. It will be an interesting future work to study the total payment of a mechanism compared to the best possible payments collected by a truthful mechanism. Note that when we know the distributions of all bids, and there is only one spectrum and no spatial and temporal reuse, Myerson [17] presented a mechanism that guarantees the payment is optimal. We note that it is very challenging to design a mechanism with a total payment close to optimum for the problem studied here.
VII. SIMULATION STUDIES
We conducted extensive simulations to study the performance of our algorithm , specifically, the competitive ratio of our algorithm in practice. We set and for algorithm . Suppose the total service time is always 2000 time slots, which is large enough compared to time requirements. In our experiment, we first generate secondary nodes that are randomly placed. We randomly deployed 100 nodes in a 5 5 square area. Assume that all secondary users locate at these positions. The geometry location of a request is exactly the location of a secondary user who claimed that request. We assume that any two requests within distance 1 will conflict with each other if they requested the same channel for some time slots. We then generate random requests with random bid values and time requirement. The bid of each request is uniformly distributed in , and the time requirement of each request is uniformly distributed in . Observe that the average load of a node in our simulation is , where is total number of requests, is the average duration of a request (thus in our setting), is total duration of scheduling (thus time slots here), and is the number of secondary users ( here). Observe that the expected number of users in a unit area is in our setting. Thus, varying and , we tested both a lightly loaded system and a highly loaded system.
A. Competitive Ratio of Algorithm
A number of parameters may affect the performances of algorithm , e.g., the number of total requests, the time bound , and the delay factor . To study the affect of these parameters, we first fix the time bound and study the competitive ratios of while the delta factor varies. Then, we fix the delta factor and study the competitive ratios of while the time bound changes. We set three different total numbers of requests in these experiments to study how the degree of competition affects 's performance.
In Fig. 4 , we plot the competitive ratios of in various cases while the delay factor is fixed [see Fig. 4(a)-(c) ]; we also plot the competitive ratios of algorithm in various cases while time bound is fixed [see Fig. 4(d)-(f) ]. In most cases, method makes a total profit that is more than 95% of the optimum offline method when . Observe that although it is NP-hard to find the optimum offline solution, we implemented a method (omitted here due to space limit) that will find an almost optimum solution (within a factor for an arbitrarily small ) when the conflict graph is a disk-intersection graph. Our experimental results are much better than the theoretical bound we proved in previous sections.
The competitive ratios decrease when increases. This is exactly what our theoretical analysis implies. When , the competitive ratio of increases significantly when delay factor increases. This implies that increasing the delay factor is a good way to achieve better performance if the delay factor is relatively small. We also observe that almost achieves the optimum offline solution when delay factor is close to or larger than , which verifies our theoretical bound. Furthermore, the competitive ratio will not improve much when . Thus, we recommend to set . The total number of requests also affects the performance of . We observe that the competitive ratios decrease when the total number of requests increases. This is because is conservative: The weak preemption in just tries to satisfy the theoretical bound, which may lose some profit potentially. Thus, when there are more requests, the optimal offline algorithm will make more profit, but the profit made by will not increase so much.
B. Efficiency Ratio of Algorithm
Recall that to ensure that secondary users will not bid a price lower than their actual values, we do not charge what they bid. For a secondary user whose request is accepted, we charge the minimum bid such that the request will still be accepted. Thus, the actual profit made is not the winners' total bids but the winners' total payments. Clearly, the total payments are no more than the total bids. Here, we define the efficiency ratio as the ratio between the profit made by our mechanism and the winners' total bids computed by our method . We also study the affect of some parameters such as the number of total requests, the time bound and the delay factor .
In Fig. 5 , we plot the efficiency ratios of our mechanism is various cases. In Fig. 5(a)-(c) , we fix time bound and plot the efficiency ratio while delay factor changes. In Fig. 5(d)-(f) , we fix delay factor and plot the efficiency ratio while time bound changes.
We observe that the efficiency ratios increase when the or the number of total requests increases. In this case, a request has more chance to conflict with other requests. Thus, it is easier to find a replacement that increases the minimum value a winner has to bid. We also find that the efficiency ratios first decrease then increase when the delay factor increases. Compared to Fig. 4(d) -(f), we know that the efficiency ratios decrease because the competitive ratios increase dramatically when is relatively small. The total payments do not increase as fast as the total bids do. When the delay factor is larger than , the efficiency ratios increase because the competitive ratios increase slowly.
C. Spectrum Utilization Ratio of Algorithm
We also studied the spectrum utilization of our method. The spectrum utilization in a time interval under a spectrum allocation method is defined as , where is the number of users who are using the channel (at different locations) at time without conflict in spectrum allocation produced by and is the maximum number of users who can use the channel concurrently without conflict. Fig. 6 reports our results. We find that varying does not affect the spectrum utilization that much. Observe that our measurement of spectrum utilization compared our method to the offline method that can arbitrarily preempt the spectrum usage. When the system is highly loaded, the spectrum utilization of our method is about 80%, while the spectrum utilization is about 50% for lightly loaded system.
D. Compare Algorithm to Simple Heuristics
We then compare algorithm to two simple greedy algorithms. One greedy algorithm always satisfies the virtual spectrum candidate request with the largest value. When a request with a larger bid is coming, will terminate current assignments with smaller value if necessary. Another greedy algorithm always satisfies the virtual spectrum candidate request with the largest value. When a request with a larger bid is coming, will terminate current assignments with smaller value if necessary. The competitive ratio of these two simple greedy algorithms could be arbitrarily bad theoretically. We conduct simulations to compare them to algorithm , which is asymptotically optimal theoretically. In Fig. 7 , we plot the competitive ratios of algorithm , simple greedy algorithm , and to compare their performances. In Fig. 7(a) -(c), we fix time bound and vary the number of total requests for different delay factors . In Fig. 7(d)-(f) , we fix time bound and vary delay factor for different number of total requests. We observe that our algorithm outperforms these two simple greedy algorithms significantly in most cases.
The affect of the number of total requests is also investigated in Fig. 7(a)-(c) . We can see that the competitive ratio of algorithm is not affected much when the number of total requests increases. On the other hand, the performance of algorithm decreases significantly when the number of total requests increases and delay factor . The competitive ratio of algorithm increases slightly when the number of total requests increases. However, the competitive ratio of algorithm is always worse than that of our algorithm .
The affect of delay factor is then investigated in Fig. 7(a)-(c) . We can see that the performances of all three algorithms increase significantly when the delay factor increases. When delay factor is increasing, our algorithm is always the best one whose performance is close to the optimum.
VIII. LITERATURE REVIEWS
The allocation of spectrums is essentially the combinatorial allocation problem, which has been well studied in the literature [1] , [14] . Yuan et al. [26] introduced the concept of a time-spectrum block to model spectrum reservation in cognitive radio networks. Li et al. [16] , [24] designed efficient methods for various dynamic spectrum assignment problems. They also showed how to design a truthful mechanism based on those methods. Zhou et al. [28] proposed a truthful and efficient dynamic spectrum auction system to serve many small players. In [29] , Zhou and Zheng designed truthful double-spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. All these results are based on offline models.
In this paper, we use the online model that is similar to the online job scheduling problems [8] . Various online scheduling problems focus on optimizing different objective functions. The most common objective function is makespan, which is the length of the schedule. Suppose that we are given identical machines, jobs arrive one by one, and no preemption is allowed. A number of results have been proven to improve the upper bounds [6] , [12] , [25] and lower bounds [11] . Closing the gap between the best lower bound (1.88 [11] ) and the upper bound (1.9201 [6] ) is an open problem. Many authors [7] , [18] also investigated the case where preemption is allowed without penalty. The online scheduling problem in which we pay penalty for rejecting jobs was first studied in [2] by Bartal et al. and improved later in [10] by Hoogeveen et al. They assume that the penalty is job-dependent only and is not affected by the preemption time.
When jobs have deadlines, however, it is usually impossible to finish all jobs. Thus, another model aims to maximize the profit or number of completed jobs. There are different variants: preemption-restart, preemption-resume, and preemptiondiscard. Koren et al. [13] gave an algorithm matching the lower bound in [3] . Woeginger [21] studied an online model of maximizing the profit of finished jobs where there is some relationship between the weight and length of the job. He provided a 4-competitive algorithm for the tight deadline case and gave a matching lower bound. Hoogeveen et al. [9] gave a -competitive algorithm that maximizes the number of early jobs. They assume that preemption is allowed while no penalties will be charged. Chrobak et al. [4] gave a -competitive algorithm that maximizes the number of satisfied jobs that have uniform length in the preemption-restart model. Zheng et al. [27] studied the preemption-restart model where a penalty is the weight of the preempted job.
The work that is most similar to our work is a recent result by Constantin et al. [5] . They proposed and studied a simple model for auctioning ad slot reservations in advance. A seller will display a set of slots at some point in the future. Until , bidders arrive sequentially and place a bid on the slots they are interested in. The seller must decide immediately whether or not to grant a reservation. Their model allows the seller to cancel at any time any reservation made earlier with a penalty proportional to the bid value. The major differences between our model and their model are as follows. Their model considers online requests and offline services. The services (ad slots) start from a fixed time and last for one unit time. Also, the preemptions happen before services start. In our model, the services (spectrum usage) can start from any time, lasting for an arbitrary duration (subject to time bound ), and the preemptions happen after the spectrum usages are assigned. We also considered the spatial reuse of spectrum resources.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied online spectrum allocation for wireless networks where a set of secondary users will bid for leasing a spectrum channel for a certain time duration in different locations. For a number of variants, we designed efficient online scheduling algorithms and analytically showed that the competitive ratios of our methods are within small constant factors of the optimum. Especially when is around the maximum requested time duration , our algorithm results in a profit that is almost optimum. Our extensive simulations show that our methods perform extremely well in practice.
We showed that no user will bid lower than its willing payment under our mechanism TOFU. It remains open to design a truthful mechanism for online spectrum auction in this setting. It is also interesting to extend our mechanism to deal with different models, such as OFDM networks, and when we know more information about requests, such as the distributions of bids, time slots requested, and arrival times.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: Assume that there is an online method with the best possible competitive ratio . Assume that at time 0, there is only one job arrived and is the only job known at time . Then, has to accept , in case is the only request. At time , after the decision is made, another job arrives, and no more jobs arrived before time . Here, is carefully chosen such that . 
